Another Failure
Re: Another Failure
Mike, I thought a patch was like a simulcast.
Re: Another Failure
There are a couple of things people should take from this incident...
First, LAPD was operating inside Corona and Riverside County without any prior coordination. They were not in communication with anyone outside their own agency, and that was by cellphone.
Second, Riverside County has an extensive conventional mutual aid network that covers VHF highband, UHF, and 800 MHz. It includes CLEMARS, The ITAC channels, and county frequencies designated for mutual aid support. These channels are available for patching, or standalone operation. In my opinion, RSO has done a poor job in sharing that resource with other agencies. They've also done a poor job managing it for themselves.
Many of the law enforcement people responding to the final shootout in the mountains were not invited, and none from LAPD were. One story I've heard, not sure if it's true or not, is that several LAPD officers were helicopter lifted to a remote hill top, and left there for the duration, just to keep them out of the way. LAPD helicopters were also seen overhead, and ordered to leave by SBSO. The turf wars were ridiculous, and did nothing to enhance anyone's safety, or the capture of Dorner.
The final point to ponder is just what exactly is interoperability. To the radio system manufacturers, and the customers they've dazzled into buying, it's a new P25 Phase II trunked system. But if interoperability is merely radios that will talk to each other, that capability has existed in California in the form of CLEMARS since the mid 60's. Those of us in the technical side of this business cringe when these things happen. It's clear to some of us that interoperability means a whole lot more than radios, but the Dorner incident is an excellent study in just how badly we're failing.
First, LAPD was operating inside Corona and Riverside County without any prior coordination. They were not in communication with anyone outside their own agency, and that was by cellphone.
Second, Riverside County has an extensive conventional mutual aid network that covers VHF highband, UHF, and 800 MHz. It includes CLEMARS, The ITAC channels, and county frequencies designated for mutual aid support. These channels are available for patching, or standalone operation. In my opinion, RSO has done a poor job in sharing that resource with other agencies. They've also done a poor job managing it for themselves.
Many of the law enforcement people responding to the final shootout in the mountains were not invited, and none from LAPD were. One story I've heard, not sure if it's true or not, is that several LAPD officers were helicopter lifted to a remote hill top, and left there for the duration, just to keep them out of the way. LAPD helicopters were also seen overhead, and ordered to leave by SBSO. The turf wars were ridiculous, and did nothing to enhance anyone's safety, or the capture of Dorner.
The final point to ponder is just what exactly is interoperability. To the radio system manufacturers, and the customers they've dazzled into buying, it's a new P25 Phase II trunked system. But if interoperability is merely radios that will talk to each other, that capability has existed in California in the form of CLEMARS since the mid 60's. Those of us in the technical side of this business cringe when these things happen. It's clear to some of us that interoperability means a whole lot more than radios, but the Dorner incident is an excellent study in just how badly we're failing.
Re: Another Failure
Let me explain what a patch is...cvrules90 wrote:Mike, I thought a patch was like a simulcast.
In a dispatch console, it's programmed with numerous "resources". These resources can be talk groups on one or more trunked systems, or they can be conventional radios, connected via wireline or microwave back to the console. They can even be intercom circuits to other dispatch centers that never actually go to a radio transmitter anywhere. From the operator's perspective, there's very little difference in how a trunked talk group, or a conventional channel behaves. In example, select the resource, press PTT, and say hello. Be heard on the other end. Where the patch fits in is, the console operator can select two or more resources and link them together. In a manner of speaking, the console then behaves like a repeater controller. Any activity received on one channel, gets repeated out the other. So, an 800 MHz talk group can be linked to VHF CLEMARS. The C3 Maestro consoles used with the EDACS system could also have permanent patches "nailed up" on an administrator terminal, so that the dispatchers had no control over them.
There are also devices like the Raytheon ACU1000 which provides the console patch functionality without all the other messy console crud, like dispatchers...
If an outside agency like LAPD were to come into anywhere within Riverside County, presumably, they could come up on VHF CLEMARS, UHF CLEMARS (in Riverside only), 800 CLEMARS, or 800 ICALL, and get their traffic patched to whatever local agency they need to talk to. The hardware works very, very well. It's a shame politics gets in the way.
Re: Another Failure
Maybe the trunked systems should be interconnected like they planned in the days of the PSeC development for cross-county comms. Mike, thanks for the explanation of patches. You can see I'm no radio geek.zz0468 wrote:There are a couple of things people should take from this incident...
First, LAPD was operating inside Corona and Riverside County without any prior coordination. They were not in communication with anyone outside their own agency, and that was by cellphone.
Second, Riverside County has an extensive conventional mutual aid network that covers VHF highband, UHF, and 800 MHz. It includes CLEMARS, The ITAC channels, and county frequencies designated for mutual aid support. These channels are available for patching, or standalone operation. In my opinion, RSO has done a poor job in sharing that resource with other agencies. They've also done a poor job managing it for themselves.
Many of the law enforcement people responding to the final shootout in the mountains were not invited, and none from LAPD were. One story I've heard, not sure if it's true or not, is that several LAPD officers were helicopter lifted to a remote hill top, and left there for the duration, just to keep them out of the way. LAPD helicopters were also seen overhead, and ordered to leave by SBSO. The turf wars were ridiculous, and did nothing to enhance anyone's safety, or the capture of Dorner.
The final point to ponder is just what exactly is interoperability. To the radio system manufacturers, and the customers they've dazzled into buying, it's a new P25 Phase II trunked system. But if interoperability is merely radios that will talk to each other, that capability has existed in California in the form of CLEMARS since the mid 60's. Those of us in the technical side of this business cringe when these things happen. It's clear to some of us that interoperability means a whole lot more than radios, but the Dorner incident is an excellent study in just how badly we're failing.
Re: Another Failure
In my mind there have always been three types of law enforcement radio interoperability. Each has unique and specific applicability (and potential drawbacks), making training and practice extremely important. I think all three are necessary.
1) Channels set aside for interoperability on an as-needed basis - This is the best known and most widely used type of interoperability. The CLEMARS, ITAC, and other national interoperability frequencies fall within this category. Many shared trunked systems have talkgroups of this kind as well.
2) Access to allied agency dispatch channels - This can be receive-only (e.g., channels accessed through scanners as other people mentioned) or transmit and receive if given permission. Useful for one field unit directly and simultaneously notifying another agency's dispatcher and field units and requesting a response within that agency's patrol area.
3) Dedicated all-agency emergency broadcast channel - All law enforcement officers from all agencies within the region (federal, state, county, city, special district, railroad, etc.) have a mobile radio programmed exclusively for this channel; a radio which they constantly monitor alongside their own dispatch channel. This is especially useful for emergencies where a response from a law enforcement officer from any agency would be appreciated, such as an "officer down" incident.
All three of these, given technical capability, would have been useful for the Dorner incident. However, Orange County is the only place I am aware of that has implemented all three of them.
1) Channels set aside for interoperability on an as-needed basis - This is the best known and most widely used type of interoperability. The CLEMARS, ITAC, and other national interoperability frequencies fall within this category. Many shared trunked systems have talkgroups of this kind as well.
2) Access to allied agency dispatch channels - This can be receive-only (e.g., channels accessed through scanners as other people mentioned) or transmit and receive if given permission. Useful for one field unit directly and simultaneously notifying another agency's dispatcher and field units and requesting a response within that agency's patrol area.
3) Dedicated all-agency emergency broadcast channel - All law enforcement officers from all agencies within the region (federal, state, county, city, special district, railroad, etc.) have a mobile radio programmed exclusively for this channel; a radio which they constantly monitor alongside their own dispatch channel. This is especially useful for emergencies where a response from a law enforcement officer from any agency would be appreciated, such as an "officer down" incident.
All three of these, given technical capability, would have been useful for the Dorner incident. However, Orange County is the only place I am aware of that has implemented all three of them.
Re: Another Failure
To be honest, I hold the same thoughts.Jlanfn wrote:In my mind there have always been three types of law enforcement radio interoperability. Each has unique and specific applicability (and potential drawbacks), making training and practice extremely important. I think all three are necessary.
1) Channels set aside for interoperability on an as-needed basis - This is the best known and most widely used type of interoperability. The CLEMARS, ITAC, and other national interoperability frequencies fall within this category. Many shared trunked systems have talkgroups of this kind as well.
2) Access to allied agency dispatch channels - This can be receive-only (e.g., channels accessed through scanners as other people mentioned) or transmit and receive if given permission. Useful for one field unit directly and simultaneously notifying another agency's dispatcher and field units and requesting a response within that agency's patrol area.
3) Dedicated all-agency emergency broadcast channel - All law enforcement officers from all agencies within the region (federal, state, county, city, special district, railroad, etc.) have a mobile radio programmed exclusively for this channel; a radio which they constantly monitor alongside their own dispatch channel. This is especially useful for emergencies where a response from a law enforcement officer from any agency would be appreciated, such as an "officer down" incident.
All three of these, given technical capability, would have been useful for the Dorner incident. However, Orange County is the only place I am aware of that has implemented all three of them.
Re: Another Failure
I think this was part of the issue:
Corona PD: VHF High
LAPD: UHF T-Band, P25.
RSO: 800 Mhz EDACS (at the time)
RPD: UHF 460 analog
SBSO: Proprietary Motorola Type II trunking 800mhz analog
CHP: VHF-Low, 7/800 portables
I think Fire has the right plan. Every fire agency who is not on VHF-High for their primary comms at least has VHF high capabilities for mutual aid incidents on every engine. (Almost ALL big fires are ran on VHF high across the country.)
Law Enforcement should follow suit, maybe everyone have at least analog 800 Mhz capability? A separate, cheap, analog only conventional 800 Mhz radio in every law enforcement vehicle in the state always on 800 CLEMARS direct would solve these issues. 800 Mhz analog conventional radios can be had used these days for less than $100.
Corona PD: VHF High
LAPD: UHF T-Band, P25.
RSO: 800 Mhz EDACS (at the time)
RPD: UHF 460 analog
SBSO: Proprietary Motorola Type II trunking 800mhz analog
CHP: VHF-Low, 7/800 portables
I think Fire has the right plan. Every fire agency who is not on VHF-High for their primary comms at least has VHF high capabilities for mutual aid incidents on every engine. (Almost ALL big fires are ran on VHF high across the country.)
Law Enforcement should follow suit, maybe everyone have at least analog 800 Mhz capability? A separate, cheap, analog only conventional 800 Mhz radio in every law enforcement vehicle in the state always on 800 CLEMARS direct would solve these issues. 800 Mhz analog conventional radios can be had used these days for less than $100.
Re: Another Failure
Or, put a scanner in every unit like RSO does/did, and that is the reason they had them. The only system currently unable to be received by a scanner is PSEC.
Re: Another Failure
It's more like 5 to 7 types of interoperability, depending on how you interpret the various documents and whitepapers out on the subject.Jlanfn wrote:In my mind there have always been three types of law enforcement radio interoperability. Each has unique and specific applicability (and potential drawbacks), making training and practice extremely important. I think all three are necessary.
The 7 levels of interoperability are:
Agencies swapping radios
Simplex on whatever common frequency band may exist.
Dedicated mutual aid channels and systems (Riverside County has this)
RF gateways and patching
Network gateways, interconnecting multiple systems to create one larger regional system
Shared systems, like what Orange and San Bernardino Counties have done.
Standards based, like P25.
You could reduce it to:
Swapping radios
Direct air interface on common channels (CLEMARS, ITAC, etc.)
Gateways (patching)
Shared system (i.e. Orange and San Bernardino Counties)
Standards based, like P25
All have advantages and disadvantages. Cost goes up as you go down the list. Effectiveness varies across the board, depending on the specific circumstances of any given event. No "one size fits all" solution will ever work satisfactorily.
The most serious drawback to the list above is that none of the many technical solutions above address politics, policy, operational procedure, training, etc. etc. etc. At least 3 of the 5 interoperability levels existed between most agencies during the Dorner incident and, to my knowledge, none of them were effectively used. This is because the politics, policy, and training are lagging years behind the technology.